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SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS:
CREDITOR’S RIGHTS VS. DEVELOPMENT
BEYOND BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF CREDITORS AND DEVELOPING STATES
by Anna Gelpern*
The title of our panel suggests a rather bipolar view of the sovereign debt predicament: On one side, there are foreign private creditors—a Citibank that made a loan
to a developing country or a Belgian dentist that bought its bond—and their goal is to
squeeze as much money as possible out of the developing country’s government. On
the other side, there is the government, which wants to keep as much money as possible for the people of the country.
This framing is increasingly out of date because of two trends: the increasing sophistication of domestic financial systems and the liberalization of capital flows. Developing
country residents buy more and more of their governments’ debt. In a restructuring,
they appear on both sides of the negotiating table, as borrowers and as creditors. For
example, the stock of Brazil’s domestic debt securities is nearly five times the size of
its external debt.1 Should Brazil’s debt ever need to be restructured, it would be hard
to ignore domestic holdings. As the structure and patterns of holding sovereign debt
instruments become progressively more complex, the tasks of debt restructuring and
economic recovery are further complicated.
Until recently there was a relatively clean division between domestic and external
debt. Foreign investors lent money to governments in the investors’ own currency, on
terms governed by the investors’ own laws, to be interpreted by the investors’ home
courts. When governments borrowed from their own citizens, they generally did so in
the local currency, under local law, subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts. It was
assumed, with some justification, that when things went bad, restructuring private external debt would be the hard part because the government had little control over the
currency, the law, or the creditors. This assumption in part explains why recent policy
proposals—both statutory and contractual—focus on private external bonds. It was
thought that the government would take care of domestic debt by printing more currency, restructuring by decree, or arm-twisting.
Even in a world neatly divided between domestic and external debt, this assumption
did not hold for long. Printing money was increasingly seen as a costly way out of domestic debt commitments, threatening economic recovery. Meanwhile, as Ecuador
showed in 1998, governments were reluctant to impose their full legal and political
might on domestic creditors, for a combination of political, economic, and financial
reasons. First, local debt holders are often political elites whose support is essential to
a government in financial crisis. Second, with the growth of domestic banks that hold
people’s deposits and lend to companies and governments, restructuring domestic
debt on punitive terms could have wide-ranging consequences.
Government debt often dominates a banking system’s assets; writing it down could
wipe out savings, foreclose credit to the private sector, and disrupt the payments system
just when all these are needed for economic recovery. Restructuring debt held by
*
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International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations.
See <http://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm>, at 85, 92.
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pension funds could wipeout people’s savings. Whether or not governments guaranteed deposits, they would be expected to recapitalize the banks, so that writing down
the debt claim on the government merely gives rise to another claim on the same
resources.
More generally, squeezing residents does not help a country’s balance of payments
or stem the outflow of resources from an economy in crisis—it essentially redistributes the losses within, like a tax. This tax on domestic debt holders is best viewed in the
context of broader economic contraction and policy adjustment: the same residents
bear the brunt of devaluation, economic contraction, policy adjustment (including
higher taxes and interest rates), and debt default. In economic if not legal terms, funds
recovered from nonresidents are an inflow. Moreover, foreign investors tend to be
more diversified—exposed to some but not all of these risks, and to a lesser degree.
All this economic reasoning is rarely persuasive to a foreign creditor who is effectively asked to subsidize the privileged treatment of domestic creditors who are not
legally senior to the foreigner. Nondiscrimination is increasingly the rallying cry of
foreign investors in financial crises. Even the sob story about wiping out people’s savings can be read as asking foreigners to bankroll bailouts of domestic bank creditors
and equity holders, who are not infrequently corrupt and politically well-connected.
In a world where domestic and external debt are clearly segregated—foreign and
domestic residents hold different instruments—foreigners can condition their restructuring on what they see as equitable treatment of the domestic holders. This is the
approach often discussed in connection with the IMF’s sovereign bankruptcy proposal2
and collective action clauses (CACs).3 It mirrors the logic of domestic bankruptcy,
where different economic interests are presumed to be represented by different legal
instruments. Bankruptcy regimes tend to disregard the identity of the creditor, striving
for identical treatment of all those holding the same instruments.
Yet the bankruptcy analogy breaks down in today’s sovereign debt world, where one
instrument can represent investors whose economic and political interests diverge wildly
in crisis. Recent liberalization of capital movements has produced a world where the
nationality of the holder and the currency and legal aspects of the instrument have
decoupled and recombined in every way possible. For example, in Russia in 1998, both
foreigners and domestic banks were holding GKOs, bonds denominated in rubles and
governed by Russian law. In Mexico in 1995, both local banks and foreign investors
bought high-yielding Tesobonos, domestic-law bonds indexed to the dollar, with dollars borrowed cheaply abroad. In Argentina in 2001, local banks and pension funds
were heavily invested in the country’s foreign-currency, foreign-law bonds. Similarly,
domestic residents are heavy investors in the external debt of Lebanon, Uruguay, and
Turkey.
We are just beginning to deal with the policy and transactional implications of this
phenomenon. Mechanically, there are three ways of approaching it:
• Offer different restructuring terms to different holders of the same instruments
(Russia’s restructuring of the GKOs post-1998);
• Try to move domestic holders into different instruments (Argentina in December 2001 converted $41 billion of foreign bonds into local loans); or
2
See, e.g., International Monetary Fund, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism—Further Considerations, Aug.
14, 2002, available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/081402.pdf>.
3
See, e.g., Lee C. Bucheit, The Search for Intercreditor Parity, 8 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 78 (1998).
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• Offer the same terms to holders of the same instruments, then compensate residents on the side, e.g., though bank recapitalization.
The choice will depend on the economics and politics of a given crisis, but at this stage
in the evolution of emerging-market sovereign debt, this much is becoming clear: First,
a bipolar framing where foreign creditors are negotiating against the people’s government no longer describes today’s complex sovereign restructurings. Domestic creditors
can be pitted openly against both their government and foreign creditors, but may
align with either. Second, looking at any one of the characteristics that describe external and domestic debt (be it currency, residence, or governing law) to the exclusion
of others will likely miss a significant part of the restructuring challenge. Finally, the
principle of nondiscrimination between foreign and domestic holders is difficult if not
impossible to uphold in crisis.
The implications of these lessons could be significant. Among them, it is worth thinking about the implications of domestic and foreign creditors being paid the same yield
for taking different risks. On the other hand, market reports suggest that external
creditors sometimes acquiesce in differential treatment inasmuch as it contributes to
recovery and the value of the debt they hold.
Complex as it is, the evolution of sovereign debt is only part of the increasing complexity of emerging-market finance. The growing phenomenon of private and subsovereign actors borrowing directly abroad (prevalent in Asia in the runup to the 1998
crisis, and significant in Argentina and Brazil today) and its implications for government finances, cross-border capital flows, wealth distribution and economic reform
after a crisis are beyond the scope of this panel, yet immensely important for understanding the broader story of globalization and development today.
REMARKS BY ROBERT B. GRAY*
The International Primary Market Association (IPMA), which I represent, is the Londonbased association of underwriters that is responsible for new-issue market practices for
international bonds. Our members include all major investment and commercial
banks active in international capital markets. Our effectiveness relies on our ability to
balance the reasonable, or even unreasonable, expectations of issuers and investors in
the interest of maintaining an efficient capital market for both.
IPMA has been cooperating with six other trade associations on a common privatesector position on crisis resolution. The group has finalized model collective action clauses
(CACs) for inclusion in bond contracts and a draft code of conduct for international
issuers and investors. We do believe that, taken together, both initiatives could make
sovereign debt workouts more orderly. We argue that they will do the job better than
a statutory mechanism, such as the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM).
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has a strong conviction that an SDRM would
benefit the workout process by allowing debtors to initiate restructurings earlier than
may otherwise be possible. I congratulate the IMF for the rigor of its analysis of the benefits of a statutory regime, but, unfortunately, the SDRM would compromise rights that
creditors are anxious to protect. The case for a statutory bankruptcy mechanism hangs
on a very thin thread: the benefit of being able to aggregate voting claims across a range
of loan and debt instruments. Unfortunately, at the end of that thread hangs a sword
*
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of Damocles that could pose a serious threat to capital flows to the world’s emerging
economies. This is the view not just of investors and underwriters but, more important,
of the issuers themselves.
I am here concerned with three aspects of the market-based versus statutory-based
approaches to crisis resolution:
(1) The practicalities of involving bondholders in sovereign debt restructurings:
How effective has the market been in achieving creditor coordination? It is
clearly more difficult to get bondholders to act together than a group of
lending banks.
(2) Why a voluntary market-based approach to crisis resolution is preferable to a
statutory approach: Here I touch on the work of our group of associations in
drafting model CACs. Such clauses are now accepted by all the key players as
an important part of the evolving financial architecture. I argue that little
divides the private sector from the official sector, not least the working group
established by the G-101 to examine the issue, when it comes to the precise
form of these clauses.
(3) What can be done to improve existing creditor coordination processes without
doing violence to creditors’ rights. How do bondholders face involvement in
IMF or Paris Club-led restructurings? The idea that in recent times the official
sector has bailed out private creditors is a myth. Bondholders, and banks for
that matter, are aware that they should absorb losses commensurate with the
risks that they take. Long before a default or rescheduling actually occurs,
emerging market bonds will typically experience dramatic falls in price, with
the holders suffering an immediate mark-to-market loss. Ecuador’s eurobonds
were trading at half their face value even before it missed its first payment on
its Brady bonds. One of the judgments bond investors have to make is whether
a sovereign that may be able to repay has the political will to make the sacrifices required to honor its obligations. Sovereign borrowers are not subject to
the ultimate remedy of insolvency proceedings and liquidation. Bondholders
understand that the threat of litigation is effectively the only card that they
have to play, and even this card is hard for an individual bondholder to play
because it is usually uneconomic for a bondholder to try to enforce rights
directly.
Since bondholders have such limited remedies, it is not surprising that they expect
workouts to be voluntary and inclusive. It is also not surprising that they react negatively to initiatives that impair, or even appear to impair, their rights. However, bondholders are increasingly aware that their interests are best served by collective action,
even if that means accepting limits on their ability to act individually. After all, CACs
were first introduced to protect creditors from each other, not to strengthen their hand
with the debtor. Unbridled freedom of individual action for one creditor can negatively
affect other creditors holding the same type of instrument. The key issue is how we can
institutionalize the principle of collective action to make creditor coordination more
effective. Through qualified majority voting, bondholders should be able to modify the
terms of a bond contract in a way that is binding on all of them. Qualified majority voting reduces both the incentives for any bondholder to seek an individual settlement
and the ability of a rogue creditor to hold for ransom the prospect of a reasonable
debt settlement.
1
The G-10 (Group of Ten) refers to a group of eleven developed countries that have agreed to participate
in the General’s Arrangements to Borrow. The BIS, European Commission, IMF, and OECD are also official
observers of the activities of the G-10.
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This idea is something to which U.S. bondholders have come late, unless one harks
back to the 1930s. The Mexico bond is the first Securities and Exchange Commission
registered issue to include a qualified majority voting clause in recent times, although
earlier 144A bonds2 from Egypt and Lebanon pointed in this direction. Significant differences between bonds have been documented under different governing laws. Under
New York and German law, bond contracts typically have required unanimous agreement among bondholders before an agreement with the debtor can be reached. Although in the case of German law, this may be a matter of statute (perhaps the Rights of
Bondholders Law of 1899), the indications are that CACs are not incompatible with
German law. In the case of sovereign bonds under English law, since the nineteenth
century 75 percent, two-thirds, and even as few as 25 percent of the bondholders can agree
to a restructuring— something that bondholders, for reasons that we can discuss, have
taken in their stride. These English clauses operate very much within the framework
of a bondholders’ meeting: if there is no quorum at the first meeting, a lower quorum
typically is required at a second meeting, which is how such low percentages can arise.
The challenge in our market, and perhaps to a lesser degree here in the United States,
is how to bring bondholders to the negotiating table. It is particularly difficult to identify and mobilize holders of bearer bonds, which are still a feature of our market.
Where bondholders need to be lobbied, it has to be done through the international
clearing systems, Euroclear and Clearstream, and through advertisements in the financial press. The international clearing systems will not disclose to an issuer or its advisers
the identity of those who have positions in the bonds. (I understand that the Depository Trust Company makes the position on this different in the United States.) Notices
or requests for proxies are given to our clearing systems which pass them on to their
participants. These participants are typically custodians, who in turn are expected to
pass all communications on to the beneficial owners, but the issuer or its advisers have
no way to know whether that has actually happened. Should the beneficial owner wish
to vote its bonds, the chain operates in reverse. If an issuer is in default, the clearing
systems will seek to have defaulted bonds withdrawn from their system to be held by
the beneficial owner directly.
Unwieldy as this all sounds, the system can be made to work. The exchange offers for
Ukraine and Ecuador certainly attracted high levels of bondholder support, well over
95 percent. The high response level was due to a combination of factors—the energetic
efforts of the banks executing the exchange offers and the effectiveness of the “exit consent” mechanism—but equally important was the flexibility that allowed the bondholders
to vote their bonds through written proxies and even through the Internet. These
cases are important because they prove that creditor coordination can be effective.
Which brings us neatly to my second topic: why a voluntary, market-based approach
is preferable to a statutory approach like the SDRM. I do not doubt that the IMF’s proposal for an SDRM has evolved to the point where it is highly creditor-friendly. What
divides us from the Fund is the feasibility of achieving collective action across a broad
range of loan and bond instruments.
The Fund has found what it believes to be an Achilles heel in the current workout
regime: the difficulty of achieving effective creditor coordination when an issuer has
outstanding a plethora of bond issues documented under different governing laws. The
Fund view is that rogue creditors are able to obstruct a restructuring by taking control
of one or more bond issues and holding out for better terms. As a result, the Fund
2
Rule 144A bonds are securities which, in accordance with General Rules and Regulations promulgated
under the Securities Act of 1933, may only be reoffered to qualified institutional buyers, as a result of which they
enjoy exemption from the broader information requirements applicable to securities offered to the public.
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argues, there is a the case for aggregation of multiple bond issues for voting purposes,
so as to dilute the role of any rogue creditor. Aggregation could certainly be effective
in eroding the power of the rogue creditor, but I question the desirability of an SDRM
that imposes a statutory aggregation scheme on outstanding bond claims, asking:
• At a philosophical level, do the benefits of aggregation outweigh the demerit of
direct interference in contractual rights?
• At a more practical level, is the need for aggregation proven?
Apparently I am more optimistic than the IMF that CACs can be made to work across
a broad range of individual bond issues and syndicated loans without the need for
statutory remedies. The key is transparency: If bank lenders or holders of an individual
bond issue feel that they are being treated fairly in relation to other creditors, they are
more likely to cooperate. If the necessary majority cannot be achieved, for whatever reason, exit consents offer an alternative market-based remedy. With the exit consent mechanism, bondholders are strongly motivated to accept an exchange offer to avoid being
left holding bonds that have been tainted by amendments to nonpayment terms, such
as negative pledge or sovereign immunity, instigated by the holders. Although viewed
by many investors as a backdoor usurpation of their rights, exit consents have proved
an important addition to the collective action armory, and an important demonstration of the creativity of the private sector when left to its own devices.
Although cases like Elliott v. Peru3 appear to have convinced the Fund that rogue
creditors weigh heavily on the sovereign debt restructuring process, in reality, there is
no recent case where rogue creditors have blocked a restructuring. The risk of rogue
creditor disruption is greatest after a restructuring has been carried out; at this stage,
rogue creditors can take control of residual securities that may not have been part of
the restructuring. If the objective of the SDRM is to weaken the role of rogue creditors,
it is a disproportionate response to an imperfectly perceived problem.
Precisely which types of CACs are likely to be accepted by the private sector? The key
CACs, already incorporated into English-law bond contracts by a broad range of emerging market issuers are:
• Majority action clauses, allowing a qualified majority of creditors to agree to a
change in the terms of a debt contract that binds all the bondholders;
• Nonacceleration clauses, requiring the concurrence of a minimum threshold of
bondholders before immediate repayment of principal after default can be
demanded; and
• Collective representation or engagement clauses, defining mechanisms for coordinating discussions and possible action between the issuer and bondholders
(ideally through a trustee).
The Mexico bond is a good example of how these clauses can be structured to balance the interests of both issuer and bondholders. The majority action level at 75
percent was lower than some investors might like, but Mexico gave something back to
investors by broadening the range of reserve matters where any amendments would
require approval, thereby making the use of exit consents more difficult.
3
In June 2000 Elliott Associates obtained a judgment against Peru for $56 million with respect to defaulted
commercial loans that had been guaranteed by Peru. Subsequently Elliott Associates successfully obtained
an order in the Brussels court restraining Euroclear from accepting or paying out cash from Peru to pay
interest due on certain Brady bonds. Peru decided to settle with Elliott Associates in order to avoid default
on the Brady bond payments.
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In the debate on CACs, most attention has been paid to the majority action clause.
It is now accepted that a supermajority rather than unanimity should be required for
amending core provisions, such as modifying scheduled principal or interest payment
dates or amounts, reserved matters the definition of which was greatly broadened in
the Mexico case.
How should the supermajority be defined? It should reflect the market experience
to date with hold-out creditors, those who may withhold their vote in the hope of getting a better deal, but it should also recognize that an apparent hold-out creditor may
merely be a passive creditor, which may value its anonymity. Nor can we ignore the
potential for sovereigns to influence the process by acquiring or controlling creditor
positions. However the majority is defined, the denominator should exclude debt held
or controlled by the sovereign debtor.
We should also rely less on bondholder meetings when more modern techniques for
collecting proxy votes may work better. Recent restructurings have taken the form of
exchange offers where bondholders are invited to exchange their bonds for new bonds
with longer maturities and lower coupons, giving the debtor some debt relief. The use
of exchange offers is a pragmatic response to the difficulty of getting bondholders to
a meeting to vote to amend their bonds. But exchange offers have their disadvantages.
Inevitably with an exchange, some of the original bondholders, either because they are
hostile to the idea or merely passive, will not tender their bonds. The part of the original bond issue that remains outstanding can fall into the hands of rogue creditors, who
may then become a thorn in the side of the debtor. Far better that the original bond
should be amended so as to bind all creditors.
The nonacceleration clause, which governs acceleration and deceleration of debt
obligations, has received less attention. In my view, it is this clause that can do the most
to shackle rogue creditors and reduce any risk of precipitous litigation. A nonacceleration clause limits the ability of a single rogue creditor to accelerate the bond without
support from other creditors; it is particularly effective when combined with a strong
provision for collective representation, such as the use of trustees.
There are ways the creditor coordination process can be improved so as to make
debt restructuring more orderly. I draw most of my conclusions from the CAC work
of our group of seven trade associations, but in some respects I go further than some
of my collaborators in the private sector. I am an unashamed believer that the Englishlaw approach is better for both issuers and investors.
It has taken the current debate on sovereign debt restructuring to focus serious market attention on the fine points of sovereign bond documentation in general and CACs
in particular. Perhaps it should not be a surprise that the market is not noticeably
aware of what appear to be only subtle differences between contracts under different
governing law. The greater apparent protection for bondholders under New York or
German law has not translated into superior price performance for New York or German law over English-law bonds. The market’s view, borne out in practice, is that no
restructuring will favor one group of bondholders over another on the basis of whether
or not their contract includes CACs or whether it is governed by one law versus another. Borrowers simply follow the practice of the time in the market in which their
bonds they are issued; as a result, the same borrower will include a unanimity provision
in its New York-law contracts but a qualified majority voting provision in its English-law
contracts. The precise form of such clauses does not figure in pre-mandate negotiations
between issuer and underwriter, or even in the period between when a bond issue is
mandated and when it is launched. It has been assumed that such matters will be left
to each party’s legal counsel.
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The decision by the United Mexican States to include a qualified majority provision
in a New York-law bond contract will likely change all that. Issuers will have to be proactive in deciding whether or not to include any CACs in their bond documentation.
Debt issuance programs give them a particular opportunity to standardize their bond
documentation. The market would welcome standardization; it is important that these
clauses be as uniform as possible.
In the period during which bond issues are launched and sold, there is little time for
investors to gauge the pros and cons of different provisions. Their main concern is
whether a given bond represents good value relative to other investment opportunities.
The least desirable outcome would be for a particular issuer’s CACs to become a source
of competition: for example, if an underwriter marketed itself to an issuer as being able
to launch an issue with a lower qualified majority level than its competitors, or if an issuer argued that a lower percentage of bondholders should be allowed to amend its
bond terms because it had stronger credit than other issuers. What we need is for
emerging-market and OECD issuers from a broad credit spectrum to follow Mexico’s
example. European Union issuers have stated their willingness to include CACs in their
foreign currency bonds, as has Canada, but I am not convinced that issuers should be
given financial incentives by the official sector, including the IMF itself, to introduce
them. If issuers need incentives to adopt these clauses, that sends a strong signal that
they may be undertaking something that is not in their interest. From their side, investors would view a system of incentives as official interference in the workings of the
market. Far better that CACs should be adopted because they represent a win-win
situation for issuers and investors—for issuers because they will be less vulnerable to
the risk of rogue investors, and for investors because workouts should be more predictable and less protracted.
Underwriters may have to temper their competitive enthusiasm and encourage issuers
to maintain standards of documentation and disclosure. The competitive enthusiasm
of underwriters may be one reason why the use of trustees has virtually disappeared
from market practice. To save the issuer a small amount of expense, underwriters failed
to stress the value of appointing trustees. IPMA believes that trustees have an important
role in improving creditor coordination. First, a bondholder trustee offers the best
opportunity for effective creditor coordination. For a start, no bondholder can take
unilateral action without involving the trustee. Litigation must be carried out by the
trustee, and any recoveries through litigation are shared pro rata among all the bondholders.
Without a trustee, too, sharing becomes impractical. Without a trustee at the center
of the process, it would be difficult to either induce a creditor that had made a disproportionate recovery to disgorge the excess or to determine which bondholders would
be entitled to share. Would it be those holding the bonds when the issuer agreed to
pay, those holding when the issuer actually paid, or those holding if a collecting bondholder actually disgorged his excess share? To use Lee Buchheit’s analogy between
bondholders and a group of theatregoers, would it be those that stayed to the end of
the play, those who left at the interval or those who paid for their tickets but did not
attend?
The second benefit of a trustee is that it provides a useful channel for communication between issuer and bondholders, given that, legally at least, neither the lead
manager nor a fiscal and paying agent has any responsibility to communicate. Many
U.S. investors seem to have some antipathy to the use of trustees, apparently grounded
in the belief that U.S. trustees have been very passive. Trustees do stick closely to the text
of the indenture in deciding what they are authorized to do. To quote Buchheit, they
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are “notoriously timid when confronted with situations in which their actions or their
acquiescence could be seen as impairing the bondholders’ rights.”4 This strikes me as
valid criticism not of the trustee concept but of how trustees have been allowed to behave in practice. Trustee timidity need not be a fact of life. In the international market,
we have seen trustees take unilateral action to put debtor into default without consulting with bondholders because it believed that the circumstances justified such action.
Both issuers and investors can benefit from bringing sovereign debt crises to a quick
resolution. Bondholders typically are not a homogeneous group; as a crisis develops,
they tend to become even less homogeneous. The introduction of CACs into loan and
bond contracts is an essential step forward. Protracted restructurings are not in the
interest of either investors or issuers. From the creditors’ viewpoint, the evidence is
that the longer a bond is in default, the lower the recovery rate. From the borrowers’
viewpoint, unresolved debt claims can help deny them further access to capital markets. CACs can help expedite the restructuring process.
We may take some comfort from knowing that things were even more difficult in the
past. Some nineteenth century reschedulings dragged on for sixty years. In the 1920s
and 1930s Thomas Lamont of J.P.Morgan negotiated with the Mexican government
on behalf of the International Committee of Bankers, which acted at that time for no
less than 200,000 foreign bondholders. In the 1930 rescheduling, all accrued but unpaid interest was fully forgiven and the principal was rescheduled into a forty-five-year
sinking-fund bond. Lamont had some battles with the official sector over the importance of protecting bondholder interests; ironically, perhaps, his antagonist was the
U.S. government in the form of Secretary of State Dwight Morrow. Perhaps those goingson were debated at an earlier Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law. I would like to think so.
4

Lee Buchheit, The Collective Representation Clause, INT’L FIN. L. REV. 10 (Sept. 1998).

